Metamorphosis of the Metaphor
To judge from its critical reception, Franz
Kafka's The Metamorphosis (Die Verwandlung) is the most haunting and
universal of all his stories; and yet Kafka never claimed for it any
particular distinction. His comments on the story in his letters and
diaries are almost entirely negative. "A pity," he wrote to Felice
Bauer on December 6, 1912, "that in many passages in the story my
states of exhaustion and other interruptions and worries about other
things are clearly inscribed. It could certainly have been more
cleanly done; you see that from the sweet pages." His disappointment
with the ending was especially great. "My little story is finished,
but today's conclusion doesn't make me happy at all; it should have
been better, no doubt about it." This charge recurs in the diary
entry for January 19, 1914: "Great antipathy to 'Metamorphosis.'
Unreadable ending. Imperfect almost to its very marrow. It would
have turned out much better if I had not been interrupted at the
time by the business trip."
Kafka's own sense of The Metamorphosis
tends, I think, to shift the weight of its significance towards its
beginning. This result is confirmed by other evidence establishing
what might be termed the general and fundamental priority of the
beginning in Kafka's works. One thinks of the innumerable openings
to stories which are scattered throughout the diaries and notebooks,
which are suddenly born and as swiftly vanish, leaving undeveloped
the endless dialectical structures they contain. Kafka explicitly
expressed, on October 16, 1921, "The misery of a perpetual
beginning, the lack of the illusion that anything is more than a
beginning or even as much as a beginning." For
Dieter Hasselblatt "[Kafka's prose] is a
fugitive from the beginning, it does not strive towards the end:
initiofugal, not final. And since it takes the impulse of its
progression from what is set forth or what is lying there at the
outset, it cannot be completed. The end, the conclusion, is
unimportant next to the opening situation."
One is directed, it would seem, by these
empirical and theoretical considerations, to formulate the
overwhelming question of The Metamorphosis as the question of the
meaning of its beginning. What fundamental intention inspires the
opening sentence of The Metamorphosis: "When Gregor Samsa woke up
one morning from unsettling dreams, he found himself changed in his
bed into a monstrous vermin (ungeheures Ungeziefer)". (All
translations of The Metamorphosis are from The Metamorphosis, newly
translated and edited by Stanley Corngold.) In answering this
question we shall do well to keep in mind, in the words of a recent
critic, "the identity [of the beginning] as radical starting point:
the intransitive and conceptual aspect, that which has no object but
its own constant clarification" (Edward Said, "Beginnings,"
Salmagundi [Fall 1968]). Much of the action of The Metamorphosis
consists of Kafka's attempt to come to terms with its beginning.
The opening of The Metamorphosis recounts
the metamorphosis of a man into a monstrous, verminous bug, but in
doing this it appears to accomplish still another metamorphosis: it
metamorphoses a common figure of speech. This second metamorphosis
emerges in the light of the hypothesis proposed, in 1947, by Gunther
Anders: "Kafka's sole point of departure is . . . ordinary
language.... More precisely: he draws from the resources on hand,
the figurative character (Bildcharakter), of language. He takes
metaphors at their word (beim Wort). For example: Because Gregor
Samsa wants to live as an artist (i.e., as a 'Luftmensch' -- one who
lives on air, lofty and flee-floating), in the eyes of the highly
respectable, hard-working world he is a 'nasty bug' ('dreckiger
Käfer'): and so in The Metamorphosis he wakes up as a beetle whose
idea of happiness is to be sticking to the ceiling" (Kafka-Pro and
Contra). For Günther Anders The Metamorphosis originates in the
transformation of a familiar metaphor into a fictional being
literally existing as this metaphor. The story develops, as aspects
of the metaphor are enacted in minute detail.
Anders's evidence for this view is furnished
partly by his entire comprehension of Kafka: "What Kafka describes
are ... existing things, the world, as it appears to the stranger
(namely strange)." Anders adduces, moreover, examples of everyday
figures of speech which, taken literally, inspire stories and scenes
in Kafka. "Language says 'To feel it with your own body' ('Am eignen
Leibe etwas erfahren') when it wants to express the reality of
experience. This is the basis of Kafka's 'In the Penal Colony,' in
which the criminal's punishment is not communicated to him by word
of mouth, but is instead scratched into his body with a needle."
Anders's hypothesis has been taken up in
Walter Sokel's writings on The Metamorphosis. The notion of the
"extended metaphor," which Sokel considers in an early essay to be
"significant" and "interesting" though "insufficient as a total
explanation of Metamorphosis," reemerges in The Writer in Extremis
as a crucial determinant of Expressionism: "The character Gregor
Samsa has been transformed into a metaphor that states his essential
self, and this metaphor in turn is treated like an actual fact.
Samsa does not call himself a cockroach; instead he wakes up to find
himself one." Expressionist prose, for Sokel, is to be defined
precisely by such "extended metaphors, metaphoric visualizations of
emotional situations, uprooted from any explanatory context." In
Franz Kafka -- Tragik and Ironie, the factual character of the
Kafkan metaphor is reasserted: "In Kafka's work, as in the dream,
symbol is fact.... A world of pure significance, of naked
expression, is represented deceptively as a sequence of empirical
facts." But in Franz Kafka, Sokel first states the "pure
significance" of Kafka's literalization of the metaphor:
German usage applies the term Ungeziefer
(vermin) to persons considered low and contemptible, even as our
usage of "cockroach" describes a person deemed a spineless and
miserable character. The traveling salesman Gregor Samsa, in Kafka's
The Metamorphosis, is "like a cockroach" because of his spineless
and abject behavior and parasitic wishes. However, Kafka drops the
word "like" and has the metaphor become reality when Gregor Samsa
wakes up finding himself turned into a giant vermin. With this
metamorphosis, Kafka reverses the original act of metamorphosis
carried out by thought when it forms metaphor; for metaphor is
always "metamorphosis." Kafka transforms metaphor back into his
fictional reality, and this counter-metamorphosis becomes the
starting point of his tale.
The sequence of Sokel's reflections on
Anders's hypothesis contains an important shift of emphasis.
Initially the force of The Metamorphosis is felt to lie in the
choice and "extension" (dramatization) of the powerful metaphor. To
confirm his view, Sokel cites Johannes Urzidil's recollection of a
conversation with Kafka: "Once Kafka said to me: 'To be a poet means
to be strong in metaphors. The greatest poets were always the most
metaphorical ones. They were those who recognized the deep mutual
concern, yes, even the identity of things between which nobody
noticed the slightest connection before. It is the range and the
scope of the metaphor which makes one a poet'" (John (sic) Urzidil,
"Recollections," The Kafka Problem, ed. Angel Flores). But in his
later work, Sokel locates the origin of Kafka's "poetry," not in the
metamorphosis of reality accomplished by the metaphor, but in the
"counter-metamorphosis" accomplished by the transformation of the
metaphor. Kafka's "taking over" images from ordinary speech enacts a
second metaphorization (metaphero = carry over) -- one that
concludes in the literalization and hence the metamorphosis of the
metaphor. This point once made, the genuine importance of Kafka's
remarks to Urzidil can be revealed through their irony. In
describing the poet as one "strong in metaphors," Kafka is
describing writers other than himself; for he is the writer, par
excellence, who came to detect in metaphorical language a crucial
obstacle to his own enterprise.
Kafka's critique of the metaphor begins
early, in the phantasmagoric story "Description of a Struggle"
(1904-1905). The first-person narrator addresses with exaggerated
severity another persona of the author:
"Now I realize, by God, that I guessed from
the very beginning the state you are in. Isn't it something like a
fever, a seasickness on land, a kind of leprosy? Don't you feel it's
this very feverishness which is preventing you from being properly
satisfied with the genuine (wahrhaftigen) names of things, and that
now, in your frantic haste, you're just pelting them with any old
(zufällige) names? You can't do it fast enough. But hardly have you
run away from them when you've forgotten the names you gave them.
The poplar in the fields, which you've called the 'Tower of Babel'
because you didn't want to know it was a poplar, sways again without
a name, so you have to call it 'Noah in his cups.'"
In the sense that "language is fundamentally
metaphoric," in the sense that naming links the significations
within words (Sprachinhalte) to the "significations to which words
accrue," [as Derrida, Weisgerber, and Heidegger argue] this critique
of naming amounts to a critique of the metaphor. But what is
remarkable about this passage is its dissatisfaction with both
ordinary names and figurative names. With the irony of exaggerated
emphasis, it calls the conventional link of name and thing "genuine"
and the act of renaming things, an act which generates metaphors,
arbitrary. The new metaphor leaves no permanent trace; it is the
contingent product of a fever, or worse: it arises from deliberate
bad faith, the refusal to accept the conventional bond of word and
thing. The exact status of ordinary names remains unclear; but what
is important is that Kafka sees no advance in replacing them with
the figures of poetic language.
In a diary entry for December 27, 1911,
Kafka states his despair of a particular attempt at metaphor: "An
incoherent assumption is thrust like a board between the actual
feeling and the metaphor of the description." Kafka has begun this
diary entry confidently, claiming to have found an image analogous
to a moral sentiment: "This feeling of falsity that I have while
writing might be represented in the following image." The image
Kafka constructs is of a man in front of two holes in the ground,
one to the right and one to the left; he is waiting for something
that can rise up only out of the hole to the right. Instead of this,
appearances rise up, one after the other, from the left; they try to
attract his attention and succeed finally in covering up even the
hole on his right. At this stage of the construction, the image
predominates in its materiality. As the image is developed, however,
the role of the spectator is developed, who expels these appearances
upwards and in all directions in the hope "that after the false
appearances have been exhausted, the true will finally appear." But
precisely at the point of conjuring up "truthful apparitions," the
metaphorist feels most critically the inadequacy of this figurative
language: "How weak this image is." And he concludes with the
complaint that between his sentiment and figurative language there
is no true coherence (though he cannot, ironically, say this without
having recourse to a figure of speech). Now what is crucial here is
that an image which is mainly material has failed to represent the
sentiment of writing; and though it has been replaced by one which
introduces the consciousness of an observer, between the moral
sentiment of writing and an act of perception there is no true
connection either. If the writer finds it difficult to construct
metaphors for "a feeling of falsity," how much graver must be his
difficulty in constructing figures for genuine feelings, figures for
gratifying the desire "to write all my anxiety entirely out of me,
write it into the depths of the paper just as it comes out of the
depths of me, or write it in such a way that I could draw what I had
written into me completely"?
Kafka's awareness of the limitations of
figurative language continues to grow more radical. The desire to
represent a state-of-mind immediately in language, in a form
consubstantial with that consciousness, and hence to create symbols,
cannot be gratified through figurative language. "For everything
outside the phenomenal world, language can only be used in the
manner of an allusion (andeutungsweise), but never even
approximately in the manner of a simile (vergleichsweise), since
corresponding as it does to the phenomenal world, it is concerned
only with property and its relations" (Dearest Father, translated by
Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins). But try as language will to reduce
itself to its allusive function, it continues to find itself
dependent on the metaphor, on accomplishing states-of-mind by means
of material analogues.
Kafka writes on December 6, 1921: "Metaphors
are one among many things which make me despair of writing.
Writing's lack of independence of the world, its dependence on the
maid who tends the fire, on the cat warming itself by the stove; it
is even dependent on the poor old human being warming himself by the
stove. All these are independent activities ruled by their own laws;
only writing is helpless, cannot live in itself, is a joke and a
despair." Indeed, the question arises, what truth could even a
language determinedly nonfigurative -- in Kafka's word, "allusive"
-- possess? The parable employs language allusively, but in the
powerful fable, "On Parables," Kafka writes: "All these parables
really set out to say merely that the incomprehensible is
incomprehensible, and we know that already." At this point, it is
clear, the literary enterprise is seen in its radical
problematicalness. The growing desperation of Kafka's critique of
metaphorical language leads to the result (in the words of Maurice
Blanchot) that, at the end of Kafka's life, ."the exigency of the
truth of this other world [of sheer inwardness desiring salvation]
henceforth surpasses in his eyes the exigency of the work of art"
("The Diaries: The Exigency of the Work of Art," translated by Lyall
H. Powers, Franz Kafka Today, edited by Angel Flores and Homer
Swander). This situation does not suggest the renunciation of
writing, but only the clearest possible perception of its
limitations, a perception which emerges through Kafka's perplexity
before, and despair of escaping, the metaphor in the work of
art.
Kafka's "counter-metamorphosis" of the
metaphor in The Metamorphosis is inspired by his fundamental
objection to the metaphor. This is accomplished -- so Anders and
Sokel propose -- through the literalization of the metaphor. But is
this true? What does it mean, exactly, to literalize a metaphor?
The metaphor designates something (A) as
something (B), something in the quality of something not itself. To
say that someone is a verminous bug is to designate a moral
sensibility as something unlike itself, as a material sensation
complicated, of course, by the atmosphere of horror which this
sensation evokes. We shall call, with I. A. Richards, the tenor of
the metaphor, (A), the thing designated, occulted, replaced, but
otherwise established by the context of the figure; and the vehicle,
the metaphor proper, (B), that thing as which the tenor is
designated (The Philosophy of Rhetoric). If the metaphor is taken
out of its context, however, if it is taken literally, it no longer
functions as a vehicle but as a name, directing us to (B) as an
abstraction or an object in the world. Moreover, it directs us to
(B) in the totality of its qualities, and not, as the vehicle, to
only those qualities of (B) which can be assigned to (A).
This analysis will suggest, I think, the
paradoxical consequence of "taking the metaphor literally,"
supposing now that such a thing is possible. Reading the figure
literally, we go to (B), an object in the world in its totality,
yet, reading it metaphorically, we go to (B) only in its quality as
a predicate of (A). The object (B) is quite plainly unstable and,
hence, so is (A); as literalization proceeds, as we attempt to
experience in (B) more and more qualities that can be accommodated
by (A), we metamorphose (A); but we must stop before the
metamorphosis is complete, if the metaphor is to be preserved and
(A) is to remain unlike (B). If, now, the tenor, as in The
Metamorphosis, is a human consciousness, the increasing
literalization of the vehicle transforms the tenor into a
monster.
This genesis of monsters occurs
independently of the nature of the vehicle. The intent towards
literalization of a metaphor linking a human consciousness and a
material sensation produces a monster in every instance, no matter
whether the vehicle is odious or not, no matter whether we begin
with the metaphor of a "louse" or of the man who is a rock or
sterling. But it now appears that Anders is not correct to suggest
that in The Metamorphosis literalization of the metaphor is actually
accomplished; for then we should have not an indefinite monster but
simply a bug. Indeed the progressive deterioration of Gregor's body
suggests ongoing metamorphosis, the process of literalization and
not its end-state. And Sokel's earlier formulation would not appear
to be tenable: the metaphor is not treated "like an actual fact."
Only the alien cleaning woman gives Gregor Samsa the factual, the
entomological identity of the "dung beetle"; but precisely "to forms
of address like these Gregor would not respond." The cleaning woman
does not know that a metamorphosis has occurred, that in this insect
shape there is a human consciousness, one superior at times to the
ordinary consciousness of Gregor Samsa. Our analysis shows that the
metamorphosis in the Samsa household of a man into a vermin is
unsettling not only because a vermin is unsettling, and not only
because the vivid representation of a "human louse" is unsettling,
but because the indeterminate, fluid crossing of a human tenor and a
material vehicle is in itself unsettling. Gregor is at one moment
pure rapture, at another, very nearly pure dung beetle, at times
grossly human, at times airily buglike. In shifting incessantly the
relation of Gregor's mind and body, Kafka shatters the suppositious
unity of ideal tenor and bodily vehicle within the metaphor. This
destruction must distress common sense, which defines itself by such
"genuine" relations, such natural assertions of analogues between
consciousness and matter, and this way masks the knowledge of its
own strangeness. The ontological legitimation for asserting
analogues is missing in Kafka, who maintains the most ruthless
division between the fire of the spirit and the principle of the
world: "What we call the world of the senses is the Evil in the
spiritual world" (Dearest Father).
The distortion of the metaphor in The
Metamorphosis is inspired by a radical aesthetic intention, which
proceeds by destruction and results in creation -- of a monster,
virtually nameless, existing as an opaque sign. "The name alone,
revealed through a natural death, not the living soul, vouches for
that in man which is immortal" (Adorno). But what is remarkable in
The Metamorphosis is that "the immortal part" of the writer
accomplishes itself odiously, in the quality of an indeterminacy
sheerly negative. The exact sense of his intention is captured in
the "Ungeziefer," a word which cannot be expressed by the English
words "bug" or "vermin." "Ungeziefer" derives (as Kafka probably
knew) from the late Middle High German word originally meaning "the
unclean animal not suited for sacrifice." If for Kafka "writing is a
form of prayer" (Dearest Father), this act of writing reflects its
own hopelessness. As a distortion of the "genuine" names of things,
without significance as a metaphor or as literal fact, the monster
of The Metamorphosis is, like writing itself, a "fever" and a
"despair."
The metamorphosis of a vermin-metaphor
cannot be understood as a real vermin, as that biting and
blood-sucking creature to which, for example, Kafka has his father
compare him in his Letter to His Father. But it may be illuminated
by the link which Kafka established earlier between the bug and the
activity of writing itself. In the story "Wedding Preparations in
the Country" (1907), of which only a fragment survives, Kafka
conjures a hero, Eduard Raban, reluctant to take action in the world
(he is supposed to go to the country to arrange his wedding); Raban
dreams instead of autonomy, self-sufficiency, and omnipotence. Kafka
finds for this transparent reflection of his early literary
consciousness the emblem of a beetle, about which there hovers an
odd indeterminacy:
"And besides, can't I do it the way I always
used to as a child in matters that were dangerous? I don't even need
to go to the country myself, it isn't necessary. I'll send my
clothed body. If it staggers out of the door of my room, the
staggering will indicate not fear but its nothingness. Nor is it a
sign of excitement if it stumbles on the stairs, if it travels into
the country, sobbing as it goes, and there eats its supper in tears.
For I myself am meanwhile lying in my bed, smoothly covered over
with the yellow-brown blanket, exposed to the breeze that is wafted
through that seldom aired room. The carriages and people in the
street move and walk hesitantly on shining ground, for I am still
dreaming. Coachmen and pedestrians are shy, and every step they want
to advance they ask as a favor from me, by looking at me. I
encourage them and they encounter no obstacle.
"As I lie in bed I assume the shape of a big
beetle, a stag beetle or a cockchafer, I think....
"The form of a large beetle, yes. Then I
would pretend it was a matter of hibernating, and I would press my
little legs to my bulging belly. And I would whisper a few words,
instructions to my sad body, which stands close beside me, bent.
Soon I shall have done -- it bows, it goes swiftly, and it will
manage everything efficiently while I rest."
The figure of the omnipotent bug is positive
throughout this passage and suggests the inwardness of the act of
writing rendered in its power and freedom, in its mystic exaltation,
evidence of which abounds in Kafka's earliest diaries:
The special nature of my inspiration . . .
is such that I can do everything, and not only what is directed to a
definite piece of work. When I arbitrarily write a single sentence,
for instance, "He looked out of the window," it already has
perfection.
My happiness, my abilities, and every
possibility of being useful in any way have always been in the
literary field. And here I have, to be sure, experienced states . .
. in which I completely dwelt in every idea, but also filled every
idea, and in which I not only felt myself at my boundary, but at the
boundary of the human in general.
How everything can be said, how for
everything, for the strangest fancies, there waits a great fire in
which they perish and rise up again.
But this is only one side of Kafka's poetic
consciousness. The other is expressed through the narrator's
hesitation in defining his trance by means of an objective
correlative ("a stag beetle ..., I think"), which suggests, beyond
his particular distress, the general impossibility of the metaphor's
naming immediately with a material image the being of an inward
state, and hence a doubt that will go to the root of writing itself.
After 1912 there will be few such positive emblems for the
inwardness and solitude of the act of writing; this "beautiful" bug
(Sokel, Franz Kafka--Tragik und Ironie) is projected in ignorance;
the truer emblem of the alien poetic consciousness, which "has no
basis, no stability" (Briefe 1902-1924), which must suffer "the
eternal torments of dying," becomes the vermin Gregor. The movement
from the beautiful bug Raban to the monstrous bug Gregor marks an
accession of self-knowledge -- an increasing awareness of the
poverty and shortcomings of writing.
The direction of Kafka's reflection on
literature is fundamentally defined, however, by "The Judgment," the
story written immediately before The Metamorphosis. "The Judgment"
struck Kafka as a breakthrough into his own style; after the night
he spent composing it, Kafka wrote in his diary, with a fine
elation, "Only in this way can writing be done, only with such
coherence, with such a complete opening out of the body and the
soul." But in his later interpretation of the story, Kafka described
it in a somewhat more sinister tonality, as having "come out of me
like a regular birth, covered with filth and mucus." The image has
the violence and inevitability of a natural process, but its filth
and mucus cannot fail to remind the reader of the strange birth
which is the subject of Kafka's next story -- the incubus trailing
filth and mucus through the household of its family.
Mainly two aspects of "The Judgment," I
think, inspire in Kafka a sense of its authenticity important enough
to be commemorated in the figure of the vermin. First, the figure of
the friend in Russia represents with the greatest clarity to date
the negativity of this "business" of writing (the friend is said by
the father to be "yellow enough to be thrown away"; secondly, "The
Judgment," like The Metamorphosis, develops, as the implications of
a distorted metaphor are enacted: "The Judgment" metamorphoses the
father's "judgment" or "estimate" into a fatal "verdict," a
death-"sentence."
Kafka's awareness that "The Judgment"
originates from the distortion of the metaphor dictates the
conclusion of his "interpretation." The highly formal tonality of
this structural analysis surprises the reader, following as it does
on the organic simile of the sudden birth: "The friend is the link
between father and son, he is their strongest common bond. Sitting
alone at his window, Georg rummages voluptuously in this
consciousness of what they have in common, believes he has his
father within him, and would be at peace with everything if it were
not for a fleeting, sad thoughtfulness. In the course of the story
the father ... uses the common bond of the friend to set himself up
as Georg's antagonist." This analysis employs the structural model
of the metamorphosed metaphor. At first Georg considers the father
as the friend; his friend, as the metaphor of the father. But
Georg's doom is to take the metaphor literally, to suppose that by
himself sharing the quality of the friend, he possesses the father
in fact. Now in a violent counter-movement the father distorts the
initial metaphor, drawing the friend's existence into himself; and
Georg, who now feels "what they have in common ... only as something
foreign, something that has become independent, that he has never
given enough protection," accepts his sentence.
It is this new art, generated from the
distortion of relations modelled on the metaphor, which came to
Kafka as an elation, a gross new birth, and a sentence; the
aesthetic intention comes to light negatively when it must express
itself through so tormented and elliptical a strategem as the
metamorphosis of the metaphor. The restrictedness and misery of this
art is the explicit subject of The Metamorphosis; the invention
which henceforth shapes Kafka's existence as a writer is original,
arbitrary and fundamentally strange. In a later autobiographical
note he writes: "Everything he does seems to him extraordinarily
new, it is true, but also, consistent with this incredible abundance
of new things, extraordinarily amateurish, indeed scarcely
tolerable, incapable of becoming history, breaking the chain of the
generations, cutting off for the first time at its most profound
source the music of the world, which before him could at least be
divined. Sometimes in his arrogance he is more afraid for the world
than for himself" (The Great Wall of China). Kafka's pride in his
separateness is just equal to his nostalgia for "the music of the
world." We shall think of the violently distorted metaphor which
yields this figure, of Gregor Samsa, who in responding to his
sister's violin playing, causes this music to be broken off. That
being who lives as a distortion of nature; who, without a history
and without a future, still maintains a certain sovereignty;
conjures through the extremity of his separation the clearest
possible idea of the music he cannot possess.
In his letter of July 5, 1922, to Max Brod,
Kafka envisions the writer as inhabiting a place outside the house
of life--as a dead man, as one among the "departed," of the
Reflections, who long to be flooded back to us. It cannot be
otherwise; the writer has no genuine existence ("[ist] etwas nicht
Bestehendes"); what he produces is devilish, "the reward for devil's
duty -- this descent to the dark forces, this unbinding of spirits
by nature bound, dubious embraces and whatever else may go on below,
of which one no longer knows anything above ground when in the
sunlight one writes stories. Perhaps there is also another kind of
writing. I only know this kind." "Yet," as Erich Heller remarks, "it
remains dubious who this 'one' is who 'writes stories in the
sunlight.' Kafka himself? 'The Judgment' -- and sunlight? 'The
Metamorphosis' . . . and sunlight . . . ? How must it have been
'below ground' if 'above ground' blossoms like these were put
forth?" (Briefe an Felice, edited by Erich Heller and Jürgen
Born).
Kafka's art, which Kafka elsewhere calls a
conjuration of spirits, brings into the light of language the
experience of descent and doubt. And even this experience has to be
repeated perpetually: "Thus I waver, continually fly to the summit
of the mountain, but then fall back in a moment.... [It] is not
death, alas, but the eternal torments of dying." There is no true
duration in this desperate flight; conjuring his own death, Kafka
writes: "The writer in me of course will die at once, for such a
figure has no basis, has no substance, isn't even of dust; is only a
construction of the craving for enjoyment. This is the writer." The
self-indulgence which defines the writer is that of the being who
perpetually reflects on himself and others. The word "figure," in
the passage above, can be taken a la lettre: the writer is defined
by his verbal figures, conceived at a distance from life, inspired
by a devilish aesthetic detachment craving to indulge itself; but he
suffers, too, the meaninglessness of the figure uprooted from the
language of life-the dead figure. Kafka's spirit then does spend
itself "zur Illuminierung meines Leichnams," in lighting up -- but
also in furnishing figural decorations for -- his corpse.
It is this dwelling outside the house of
life, "Schriftstellersein," the negative condition of writing as
such, which is named in The Metamorphosis; but it cannot name itself
directly, in a language that designates things that are, or in the
figures that suggest the relations between things constituting the
common imagination of life. Instead Kafka utters in The
Metamorphosis a word for a being unacceptable to man (ungeheuer) and
unacceptable to God (Ungeziefer), a word unsuited either to intimate
speech or to prayer. This word evokes a distortion without visual
identity or self-awareness -- engenders, for a hero, a pure sign.
The creature of The Metamorphosis is not a self speaking or being
silent but language itself (parole) -- a word broken loose from the
context of language (language), fallen into a void the meaning of
which it cannot signify, near others who cannot understand it.
As the story of a metamorphosed metaphor,
The Metamorphosis is not just one among Kafka's stories but an
exemplarily Kafkan story; the title reflects the generative
principle of Kafka's fiction--a metamorphosis of the function of
language. In organizing itself around a distortion of ordinary
language, The Metamorphosis projects into its center a sign which
absorbs its own significance (as Gregor's opaque body occludes his
awareness of self), and thus aims in an opposite direction from the
art of the symbol; for there, in the words of Merleau-Ponty, the
sign is "devoured" by its signification (Phénoménologie de la
perception). The outcome of this tendency of The Metamorphosis is
its ugliness. Symbolic art, modelled on the metaphor which occults
the signifier to the level of signification, strikes us as
beautiful: our notion of the beautiful harmony of sign and
significance is one dominated by the human signification, by the
form of the person which in Schiller's classical conception of art
"extirpates the material reference." These expectations are
disappointed by the opaque and impoverished sign in Kafka. His art
devours the human meaning of itself, and indeed must soon raise the
question of a suitable nourishment. It is thus strictly internally
coherent that the vermin -- the word without significance -- should
divine flesh nourishment and affinity in music, the language of
signs without significance.
But the song which Gregor hears does not
transform his suffering; the music breaks off; the monster finds
nourishment in a cruder fantasy of anger and possession. This scene
communicates the total discrepancy between the vermin's body and the
cravings appropriate to it, and the other sort of nourishment for
which he yearns; the moment produces, not symbolic harmony, but the
intolerable tension of irreconcilables. In Kafka's unfathomable
sentence: "Was he an animal, that music could move him so?", paradox
echoes jarringly without end.
At the close of The Metamorphosis Gregor is
issued a death-sentence by his family which he promptly takes over
as his own; he then passes into a vacant trance.
He had pains, of course, in his whole body,
but it seemed to him as if they were gradually getting weaker and
weaker and would finally go away entirely. The rotten apple in his
back and the inflamed area around it, which were completely covered
with fluffy dust, already hardly bothered him. He thought back on
his family with deep emotion and love. His conviction that he would
have to disappear was, if possible, even stronger than his sister's.
In this state of empty and peaceful reflection, he remained until
the tower clock struck three in the morning.
He is empty of all practical concerns; his
body has dwindled to a mere dry husk, substantial enough to have
become sonorous, too substantial not to have been betrayed by the
promise of harmony in music. He suggests Christ, the Christ of John
(19:30) but not of Matthew (27:50) or Mark (15:37), for Gregor's
last moment is silent and painless. "He still sensed that outside
the window everything was beginning to grow bright. Then, against
his will, his head sank down to the floor, and from his nostrils
came his last weak stream of breath." For a moment the dim desert of
Gregor's world grows luminous; his opaque body, progressively
impoverished, achieves a faint translucency. Through the destruction
of the specious harmony of the metaphor and the aesthetic claims of
the symbol, Kafka engenders another sort of beauty and, with this,
closes a circle of reflection on his own work. For, in 1910, just
before his mature art originates as the distortion of the metaphor,
Kafka wrote in the story fragment, "'You,' I said ...": "Already
what protected me seemed to dissolve here in the city. I was
beautiful in the early days, for this dissolution takes place as an
apotheosis, in which everything that holds us to life flies away,
but even in flying away illumines us for the last time with its
human light" (Diaries).
At the close of The Metamorphosis the
ongoing metamorphosis of the metaphor accomplishes itself through a
consciousness empty of all practical attention and a body that
preserves its opacity, but in so dwindled a form that it achieves
the condition of a painless translucency, a kind of beauty. In
creating in the vermin a figure for the distortion of the metaphor,
the generative principle of his art, Kafka underscores the
negativity of writing, but at the same time enters the music of the
historical world at a crucial juncture; his art reveals at its root
a powerful romantic aesthetic tradition associated with the names of
Rousseau, Hölderlin, Wordsworth, Schlegel, Solger, which criticizes
symbolic form and metaphorical diction in the name of a kind of
allegorical language. The figures of this secular allegory do not
refer doctrinally to Scripture but to the source of the decision to
constitute them. They replace the dogmatic unity of sign and
significance with the temporal relation of the sign to its luminous
source. This relation comes to light through the temporal difference
between the allegorical sign and the sign prefiguring it; the exact
meaning of the signs is less important than the temporal character
of their relation. The vermin that alludes to verminfigures in
Kafka's early work, whose death amid increasing luminousness alludes
casually to Christ's, is just such a figure. But to stress now the
temporal character of the metamorphosed metaphor of The
Metamorphosis is to distinguish it fundamentally from the "extended
metaphor" of Sokel's discussion; for in this organistic conception
of the figure, sign and significance coincide as forms of extension.
And if expressionism is to be defined by its further extension of
metaphor, then The Metamorphosis cannot be accommodated in an
expressionist tradition.
But though The Metamorphosis joins an
allegorical tradition within romanticism, it does so only for a
moment before departing radically from it. The light in which Gregor
dies is said explicitly to emanate from outside the window and not
from a source within the subject. The creature turned away from
life, facing death, and as such a pure sign of the poetic
consciousness, keeps for Kafka its opaque and tellurian character.
It is as a distorted body that Gregor is struck by the light; and it
is in this light principally unlike the source of poetic creation
that the work of art just comes to recognize its own truth. For,
wrote Kafka, "our art is a way of being dazzled by truth; the light
on the flinching, grimacing face (zurückweichenden Fratzengesicht)
is true, and nothing else" (Dearest Father). Because the language of
Kafka's fiction originates so knowingly from a reflection on
ordinary speech, it cannot show the truth except as a solid body
reflecting the light, a blank fragment of "what we call the world of
the senses, [which] is the Evil in the spiritual world (Dearest
Father).
And so the figure of the nameless vermin
remains principally opaque. More fundamental than the moment of
translucency; reflecting itself not so much in the dawn as in the
fact that this moment is obtained only at death and without a
witness; is the horror that writing could never amount to anything
more than the twisted grimace on which glances a light not its own.
Here the essentially linguistic imagination of Kafka joins him to a
disruptive modern tradition, described in these words of Michel
Foucault:
The literature of our time is fascinated by
the being of language.... As such, it brings sharply to light in
their empirical vividness the fundamental forms of finitude. From
inside language experienced and traversed as a language, in the play
of its possibilities taken to their limit, what comes to light is
that man is "finite"; and that arriving at the summit of all
possible utterance, it is not to the heart of himself he comes, but
to the edge of that which limits him: that region where death
prowls, where thought fades out, where the promise of the origin
retreats indefinitely.... And as if this probing of the forms of
finitude in language could not be borne . . . it has manifested
itself inside madness -- the figure of finitude thus appearing in
language as that which discloses itself in it but also before it, on
its near side, as this shapeless, mute, meaningless region in which
language can liberate itself. And it is truly in this space thus
laid open that literature ... more and more purely with Kafka, with
Bataille, with Blanchot has appeared . . . as the experience of
finitude.
(Words and Things)
From Mosaic 3, no. 4 (1970). © 1970 by the
University of Manitoba Press.
~~~~~~~~
By Stanley Corngold
Edited by Harold Bloom
STANLEY CORNGOLD is Professor of German and
Comparative Literature at Princeton University. A leading Kafka
scholar, he is the author of The Commentators' Despair: The
Interpretation of Kafka's Metamorphosis and the editor of an
annotated critical edition of The Metamorphosis.
HAROLD BLOOM, Sterling Professor of the
Humanities at Yale University, is the author of The Anxiety of
Influence, Poetry and Repression, and many other volumes of literary
criticism. His forthcoming study, Freud: Transference " and
Authority, attempts a full-scale reading of all of Freud's major
writings. A MacArthur Prize Fellow, he is general editor of five
series of literary criticism published by Chelsea House. During
1987-88, he served as Charles Eliot Norton Professor of Poetry at
Harvard University. |